SUMMARY of CHANGE
Response and Assistance (NAIRA), 27 December 1988. Eliminates the responsibilities of Army commanders to respond to accidents involving Army nuclear weapons or Army nuclear weapon delivery systems. The Army no longer possesses these assets.
o Highlights general guidance for responding to radiological emergencies involving both nuclear weapons and nuclear reactor facilities. This chapter is general in nature and directs the reader to previously published and approved procedures (chap 2).
o Clarifies response requirements for accidents occurring at one of the Army's nuclear reactors. Because of the absence of explosive material in a reactor, and the physical construction of a nuclear reactor facility, there exists an inherent ability to restrict the spread of contamination should an accident occur. The actions taken to prevent contamination and damage to personnel and property are significantly different from the actions taken in an accident involving a nuclear weapon (chap 3).
o Summarizes the objectives of each element responding to a nuclear accident. Although many of the actions required to successfully recover from a nuclear accident or incident will have inputs from several responders, specified elements (chap 4) will be responsible and will monitor each objective. Introduction
1-1. Purpose
This pamphlet is intended to be a reference for the commander and staff when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a nuclear accident or incident (NAI). It highlights existing doctrine and guidance used to respond to an NAI involving nuclear weapons. It explains the concepts and procedures to be used by an emergency response force while executing NAI response and assistance (NAIRA) operations at Army reactor facilities. It will also assist all levels of command in developing plans for responding to all types of nuclear hazards. Although this pamphlet is not designed to address the requirements for responding to a terrorist use of nuclear material in the public domain, some of the techniques and procedures may be adopted for use in these situations.
1-2. References
Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.
1-3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms
Abbreviations and special terms used in this pamphlet are explained in the glossary. b . O t h e r H Q D A p r i n c i p a l e l e m e n t s s u p p o r t N A I R A o p e r a t i o n s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r i n h e r e n t A r m y S t a f f responsibilities.
1-4. Nuclear accident or incident response and assistance activities
c. The commander of the major Army command (MACOM) or Army component of the unified or specified command will execute initial command and control of emergency response forces and their activities at a NAI location when in-
(1) Command of the facility or installation on which the NAI occurs.
(2) Custody of the nuclear material at the time of the NAI occurring off-post. d. The Commanding General, Forces Command, in coordination with the MACOM owning the reactor-(1) Provides an augmentation force to support security forces at the nuclear reactor facilities covered by AR 190-54, Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials.
(2) Provides security forces to meet the requirements for recovery of lost, seized, or stolen special nuclear material (SNM) in accordance with AR 190-54.
e. The combatant commander having responsibility for responding to the accident is required to organize the Response Task Force (RTF) in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3150.8, DoD Response to Radiological Accidents. There are currently two Army RTFs established within the continental U.S. In general, the RTF-(1) May be either Joint or formed from a single Service.
(2) On U.S. territory, is responsible for DOD taskings in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP).
(3) On foreign territory, is responsible for DOD taskings in accordance with applicable Host Nation and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).
(4) Is expected to perform the responsibilities established in DOD Manual 3150.8-M.
f. An escort officer, accompanying a SNM shipment, as a representative of a MACOM, Department of Energy (DOE), or field operating agency, oversees all actions at the scene of the NAI occurring outside the boundaries of a military installation until relieved by the commander of a designated initial response force (IRF) or the RTF commander.
g. Commanders of Army installations provide an IRF when directed to a NAI occurring off-post in the vicinity of their installation. An IRF may be directed to deploy as the result of a request for assistance by local authorities, on the direction to do so by a combatant commander or the National Military Command Center, or at the installation commander's decision, depending on the situation.
(1) The IRF will provide immediate safety, security, rescue, command, control, and communications at the accident/ incident site, to save lives and reduce exposure to hazards (AR 500-60, para 2-1f). An IRF will consist of available installation assets. The installation need not have a nuclear mission or radiological responsibility, but its IRF must accomplish minimum functions outlined in paragraph 2-5 below. Installations do not have to create specially trained and/or dedicated organizations.
(2) In most cases, DOD will not be the lead Federal agency (LFA) in a NAI. Until the LFA is determined, a senior official is designated.
(3) The senior military member or designated civilian official oversees all actions at the accident/incident site until arrival of the RTF.
Chapter 2 Emergency Response System
Section I Introduction 2-1. Preparation and response overview This chapter provides preparation and response information pertinent to the Department of the Army (DA) and Federal, State, and local government agencies. Specifically, this section contains a brief synopsis of the key regulatory documents that provide the basic framework within which responding agencies will execute emergency operations. Section II depicts the role of Army emergency response forces, referring the reader to Federal plans that provide comprehensive guidance on the roles of the IRF and the RTF commanders. Appendix B lists national and State points of contact for NAIRA operations.
2-2. Principal documents
Public law, Executive orders, DOD directives, and Army regulations provide the governing framework for coordinating the efforts of the various agencies responding to a NAIRA. The more significant ones are briefly described below to assist the reader's comprehension of the emergency response system described in section Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) . This manual, developed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, provides information necessary to understand the overall response concept, the role of the IRF, the RTF, and the interactions between DOD and other Federal agencies. Most of the response requirements for accidents involving nuclear weapons are defined in this manual.
b. AR 50-5. This regulation prescribes policies, responsibilities, and procedures for the Army Nuclear Surety Program of which NAIRA operations are an integral part.
c. The Federal Response Plan. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Federal Response Plan (FRP) (9230.1-PL) establishes relationships among the Federal agencies that are responding to an emergency. The emergency situation does not necessarily involve nuclear weapons or material.
d . F e d e r a l R a d i o l o g i c a l E m e r g e n c y R e s p o n s e P l a n ( F R E R P ) .
T h e F e d e r a l E m e r g e n c y M a n a g e m e n t A g e n c y radiological plan elaborates on the FRP to specifically address the Federal response to radiological emergencies in a peacetime environment.
Section II Army Emergency Response System

2-3. Organizational concept
a. The Army Emergency Response System provides commanders with an organization and means to prepare for, respond to, and recover from an NAI. It is a system of personnel, facilities, and communications through which commanders are able to plan, coordinate, and direct NAIRA operations. It extends through all echelons from HQDA DCS, G-3 to research, development, test, and evaluation laboratories and Army reactor facilities. At installation level, the commander establishes emergency response forces consistent with the NAI potential. For those nuclear events that exceed the emergency capabilities of an installation, DOD 3150.8-M outlines specific organizations that maintain emergency response forces manned and equipped to provide for sustained operations. In addition, if need be, the total resources of the DOD are available for NAIRA operations.
b. The Army Emergency Response System complements the FRP, thereby providing commanders access to resources available from a variety of Federal departments as well as State and local governments. Conversely, the FRP can readily access the Army's system for additional support during times of emergencies in civilian communities. The DOD will normally provide support only when other resources are unavailable and only if such support does not interfere with its primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies.
c. The Army's emergency response system is organized along the principles of centralized control and decentralized execution. Centralized control of emergency assets provides the commander with the capability of marshaling and integrating resources for deployment to the scene of a NAI. It also provides the capability to fully exploit the flexibility of assigned or attached resources.
d. The Army Operations Center (AOC), located in the Pentagon, is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and serves as an operations and information command center for HQDA. The Director, AOC notifies the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate HQDA elements of significant global events. The AOC supports crisis management operations during emergency situations that exceed the administrative and logistical support of the Secretariat and Army Staff.
e. The United States Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA) supports the AOC with a NAIRA duty officer on call in the event of an emergency.
2-4. Emergency response forces
The responsibilities and duties of the emergency response forces are detailed in the DOD 3150.8-M. The response to a NAI consists of four phases: Notification, Response, Emergency Management, and Site Remediation/Recovery. In general, emergency response forces are divided into two groups: the IRF and the RTF.
2-5. The Initial Response Force
a. The initial response. It is assumed that a nuclear accident or incident will occur with little or no warning. The nearest military installation commander will probably be tasked to provide an initial response force and may be required to support other Government agencies responding to the accident or incident. The installation commander will implement the NAIRA plan. The IRF commander or designated representative will make initial notification to the National Military Command Center, the Army Watch Officer in the Army Operations Center, and local and State authorities. The IRF is an installation level emergency response force organized to provide a first response to an accident or incident. The first response will consist of the notification of the incident and the initial deployment of personnel to maintain command and control onsite, pending the arrival of the RTF. Communications at the accident scene will initially be limited to the organic assets of the responding IRF. These initial limited assets should be augmented as soon as possible to provide communication with arriving follow-on forces. The IRF is formed from organic assets available to the installation commander. The installation providing support to a NAIRA will take all measures before, during, and after a nuclear accident or incident to (in order of priority)- (b) If responding to an NAI on foreign territory, establish contact with the U.S. Chief of Mission and chain of command.
(c) If responding to an NAI on an Army nuclear reactor installation, establish command and control through the host installation to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, in accordance with approved emergency response plans. Required reports are outlined in appendix B of AR 50-5. (OPREP-3 FADED GIANT (Requirement Control Symbol DD A&T (AR) 1168) is used to provide notification of nuclear reactor or radiological accidents or incidents.)
(2) Extinguish fires and begin rescue and evacuation of casualties.
(a) Initial emergency actions will take priority over security and Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements. As the situation stabilizes, security and PRP requirements will be enacted.
(b) Medical and fire fighting responders will coordinate with EOD personnel to determine hazards in the accident area. If a nuclear weapon is involved and is exposed to high temperature, civilian fire departments will require advice on proper cooling of the weapon and additional precautions to take. If at all possible, EOD personnel should make an initial assessment of the accident/incident site, but fire fighting and rescue and evacuation of casualties will not be delayed solely to perform an initial survey of the site.
(c) Local ambulances and hospitals may be used for evacuation and treatment of casualties. Casualties will be decontaminated, if possible, prior to evacuation, but in no case will treatment be delayed solely for the purpose of decontaminating casualties. Contaminated casualties will be identified to the receiving facility.
(3) Establish local security. If sufficient security personnel are available and the accident/incident involves nuclear material in either DOD or DOE custody on non-Federal property, establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or national security area (NSA) in accordance with DODD 5200.8. If military security forces are unavailable or insufficient, local law enforcement personnel may be asked to restrict access to the area until a NDA or NSA can be established.
(4) Perform necessary EOD procedures. If the accident involves nuclear weapons, EOD personnel will perform a damage assessment and, if necessary, perform necessary electrical render safe procedures. If the accident/incident involves explosives, EOD personnel will make an assessment of the situation and recommend courses of action to the IRF commander.
(5) Conduct radiation monitoring and limit spread of contamination.
(a) Initial radiation monitoring will be accomplished. EOD personnel have organic radiation detection and monitoring equipment to support EOD operations and often will provide the initial confirmation of the presence of radioactive contamination at the accident/incident site. Additional assets will be required to monitor personnel and equipment used during the initial phases of the response effort.
(b) Contamination control measures should be enacted to limit spread of contamination. If no local decontamination assets are available, EOD personnel can recommend appropriate actions to take, to include establishment of a temporary contamination control line. EOD personnel responding to an NAI site have limited emergency contamination control capabilities and will not be tasked to perform large-scale contamination control or decontamination functions.
(c) Army nuclear reactor facilities will develop radiation detection, monitoring, and contamination control plans as part of their overall emergency response plans.
(6) Supporting Army elements.
(a) The Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) assists and furnishes radiological health hazard guidance and exposure level criteria to the commander of the RTF (CRTF), other responsible officials at the accident/incident site, and to the installation and local medical authorities.
(b) The Radiological Control (RADCON) Team is a special radiological team organized to provide technical assistance and advice to the CRTF in all levels of radiological emergencies.
(c) The nearest Army regional medical center and/or the nearest Army community hospital with a nuclear medicine clinic can provide personnel and equipment to the IRF commander to help with initial monitoring.
(d) Rapid and timely characterization of contamination can greatly reduce the further spread of contamination to personnel and the environment.
(7) Initiate a public affairs program as necessary. Department of Defense Directive 5230.16, Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance, contains additional guidance concerning the confirmation or denial of the presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. Introduction
3-1. Overview
This chapter provides information pertinent to the Army owned reactor facilities. Primarily, it outlines the American National Standards that have been established by the American Nuclear Society for emergency planning at nuclear reactors. The scope of NAIRA operations at the Army's test reactors will differ significantly from NAIRA operations at other sites in that no explosive material will be present, the facilities are built with the intent of containing contamination inside the facility, and the quantities of nuclear materials are relatively small compared to nuclear weapons or full-scale power producing reactors.
3-2. Principal documents
The American Nuclear Society publishes American National Standards for nuclear reactors. Nuclear reactors are required to abide by these national standards in order to operate. The national standards take into account the type of reactor, purpose, and physical characteristics of the individual reactor and place appropriate operating guidelines for that reactor. The Army Reactor Office oversees and ensures the safe operation of Army-owned reactors and ensures compliance with national standards. 
Section II Emergency plans for Army reactors
3-3. Emergency plan contents
a. Accidents and incidents at Army reactor facilities pose significantly less risk than accidents involving nuclear weapons. The response to such incidents is not as detailed for the following reasons:
(1) Army research reactors do not produce thermal radiation, blast, or electronic pulses.
(2) The maximum credible event/accident (MCE/A) is minuscule when compared to nuclear weapons or power reactors.
b. National standard ANSI/ANS-15.16 describes the specific elements of the NAIRA plans. In brief, these plans include the following parts:
(1) Introduction. The introduction will state the type of reactor, purpose, location, and purpose of the emergency plan to include the scope and applicability.
(2) Definitions. This section defines terms specific to the reactor facility.
(3) Organization and responsibilities. The organization refers to the onsite and offsite organizations that will be activated in the event of an emergency. Each organization's responsibilities are listed.
(4) Emergency Classification System/emergency action levels. These are the various levels of emergencies that can be expected. The emergency plan will describe the progressively more serious accidents and the scope of notification at each level.
(5) Emergency Planning Zones. Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) are areas for which offsite emergency planning is performed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident. Evaluating radioactive releases from credible accidents and comparing those release levels to the acceptable levels of exposure to offsite personnel determine the EPZ. The power level of the reactor can also be used to determine the EPZ according to ANSI/ANS-15.16.
(6) Emergency response. Emergency response includes the actions required to notify the emergency organizations, assess the extent of the emergency, and protect personnel.
(7) Emergency facilities and equipment. This also includes the type of facilities, equipment, supplies, and location. (8) Termination and recovery. The emergency plan should include criteria for the termination of the emergency situation. It should also provide criteria for restoring the reactor facility to a safe status and reentry to the facility.
(9) Plan maintenance. This includes measures designed to provide emergency personnel proper training, evaluate their performance during drills, maintain required emergency equipment, and periodically review of the emergency plan.
3-4. Emergency plan approval
Emergency plans for Army reactor facilities will be submitted for review and approval by the Army Reactor Office, in accordance with AR 50-7. Each reactor facility director, in coordination with the responsible commander, will exercise the plans at least annually.
3-5. Support to organic nuclear reactor facility security forces AR 190-54 tasks the Commanding General, Forces Command, in coordination with the MACOM owning the reactor, to provide an augmentation force to support security forces at the nuclear reactor facilities covered by the regulation. Chapter 5 of AR 190-54 contains the requirements for recovery of lost, seized, or stolen SNM.
Chapter 4 Response Force Exercises
4-1. Overview
Exercises should be conducted every 2 to 3 years to evaluate the effectiveness of the response forces. The following exercise objectives are stated for planning and evaluation purposes. Although some functions are shared between responding elements, the main objectives are grouped according to the responding elements found in paragraphs 2-5b and c in this publication.
4-2. Summary of on-scene objectives
a. Command and control objectives.
(1) Site setup and site operations. (1) Establish and maintain effective communications at all levels, to include the use of land mobile communications (for example, radio, phones) between scene, next in line emergency control center, RTF, and JOC.
(2) Timely initial accident notification, verification, and follow-on civil and military reporting to and among command agencies.
(3) The notification of appropriate officials, staff agencies, and activation of specialized response teams. (1) The evacuation of casualties from the secure area.
(2) The execution of plans and use of assets for casualty management at the scene including triage of patients, risk assessment for caretakers, hot line management, and biohazards. (5) The use of electronic means, to include the Internet, to prepare, coordinate, and disseminate information to the public and the media.
(6) Procedures to schedule media briefings, prepare individuals for briefing, and conduct briefings. (1) Procedures for providing emergency assistance for those in need.
(2) If the NAI was a result of a criminal act or omission, the local military police will be notified and subsequently the local USACIDC will be notified to investigate any felony crimes acts committed. The Judge Advocate General (JAG) will be responsible point of contact for other than criminal investigations.
(3) If the NAI was a result of a criminal act or omission, USACIDC or the military police Investigators will determine the evidence to be collected and preserved. 
Section II Terms
Remediation Actions taken to provide aid and repair to an area damaged by an NAI in an effort to return that area to its original condition.
Response Task Force (RTF)
A unified command response force that is appropriately manned, equipped, and capable of performing and coordinating all actions necessary to effectively control and recover from an accident or incident. The specific purpose of a RTF is to provide radiological accident or significant incident assistance.
Section III Special Abbreviations and Terms
NSA national security area
PRP
Personnel Reliability Program
